Abstract. Varieties of natural deduction systems are introduced for Wansing's paraconsistent non-commutative substructural logic, called a constructive sequential propositional logic (COSPL), and its fragments. Normalization, strong normalization and Church-Rosser theorems are proved for these systems. These results include some new results on full Lambek logic (FL) and its fragments, because FL is a fragment of COSPL.
Introduction
Wansing's paraconsistent non-commutative substructural logic, called a constructive sequential propositional logic (COSPL) in [15] , is a conservative extension of full Lambek logic (FL) by adding the strong negation connective ∼, and is a structural rule-free variant (i.e., without any structural rules) of Nelson's paraconsistent logic N4. In this paper, various Gentzen-type natural deduction systems are introduced for COSPL and its fragments. Normalization, strong normalization and Church-Rosser theorems are shown for some such proposed systems. The results of this paper include some new results on FL and its fragments.
Natural deduction systems (and typed λ-calculi) for some fragments of FL have been proposed by several researchers [5, 12, 14, 15, 16] . A detailed presentation of Curry-Howard correspondences for some fragments of various sybsystems of intuitionistic logic (including some fragments of FL) was studied by Wansing [14, 15] in order to consider the relationship between cut-elimination and normalization. It was also shown in [14, 15] that the strong normalization theorem holds for a two-directional typed λ-calculus for the {/, \, * }-fragment of FL, where / and \ denote the two kinds of implication connectives, and * denotes the multiplicative conjunction (or fusion) connective. Some natural deduction systems for the {/, \}-fragments of (the original) Lambek calculus and FL were studied by van Benthem [1] and Tiede [12] to deal with some applications to formal grammars. In [1, 12] , sequence-type assumptions were adopted for the underlying natural deduction systems. Some natural deduction systems for FL were studied by Watari et al. [16] to investigate normalization. Varieties of natural deduction systems for substructural logics including the {/, * , ∧}-fragment of FL were introduced systematically by Mouri [5] based on the notion of labeled assumptions. Until now, a natural deduction system for COSPL has not been proposed.
The contents of the present paper are then summarized as follows.
In Section 2, a sequent calculus COSPL is introduced, and some basic properties for COSPL are reviewed. Three sequent calculi FL, C and L are also introduced as the ∼-free, {/, \, * , ∼}-and {/, \, * }-fragments of COSPL, respectively. An illustrative example for medical reasoning based on COSPL is shown by the virtue of non-commutativity and paraconsistency.
In Section 3, three natural deduction systems N L , N C and N 2 C are introduced for L, C and also C, respectively. In these systems, the construction by Mouri [5] using labelled assumptions is adopted. The equivalences between N L and L, between N C and C, and between N 2 C and N C are proved. In Section 4, in order to prove the strong normalization and ChurchRosser theorems for N L , N C and N 2 C , the corresponding typed λ-calculi λ L , λ C and λ 2 C are introduced based on the Curry-Howard correspondences. The definition of the two-directional λ-term using two kinds of abstraction operators by Wansing [14, 15] is adopted to these calculi. The strong normalization theorems for λ L , λ C and λ 2 C are proved, and hence the same theorems for N L , N C and N 2 C are shown. The Church-Rosser theorems for λ L , λ C , λ 2 C , N L , N C and N 2 C are shown as a corollary. In addition, two alternative typed calculi λ 3 C and λ 4 C , which are nearly equal to λ C and λ 2 C , respectively, are introduced. The strong normalization and Church-Rosser theorems are proved for these calculi. The results in Sections 3 and 4 are considered to be difficult to extend to the full system COSPL, and hence other frameworks are needed to give some natural deduction systems for COSPL and also for FL.
In Section 5, firstly, a general natural deduction system N-COSPL (with general elimination rules) for COSPL is introduced based on the framework by Negri [6] for intuitionistic linear logic. Secondly, a uniform natural deduction system U-COSPL (with general elimination and introduction rules) are introduced following the framework by Negri [7] . The normalization theorems for N-COSPL and U-COSPL are proved by using the relationships between cut-free COSPL, N-COSPL and U-COSPL. It is known that the frameworks by Negri [6, 7] have a simple definition of normalization, and can obtain a natural correspondence between normal proofs and cut-free proofs. The discussion of this section obviously include the same results for FL, and hence such a discussion on FL is omitted.
In Section 6, some remarks on the proposed systems are given. In Section 7, the conclusion of this paper is addressed.
Sequent calculus and illustrative example 2.1. Sequent calculus
Formulas are constructed from propositional variables, propositional constants: 1 (multiplicative truth), ⊤ (additive truth) and ⊥ (additive falsity), two kinds of implications: / and \, * (fusion), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction) and ∼ (strong negation). Lower-case letters p, q, ... are used to denote propositional variables, Greek lower-case letters α, β, ... are used to denote formulas, and Greek capital letters Γ, ∆, ... are used to represent finite (possibly empty) sequences of formulas. Parentheses for * are sometimes omitted because * is associative. A sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ γ. The symbol ≡ is used to denote equality of sequences of symbols. Since all logics discussed in this paper are formulated as sequent calculi, a sequent calculus will occasionally be identified with the logic determined by it.
Definition 2.1 (COSPL, FL, C and L). The initial sequents of COSPL are of the form:
The inference rules of COSPL are of the form:
The ∼-free fragment of COSPL is called FL (full Lambek logic). The {/, \, * }-fragment of FL and the {/, \, * , ∼}-fragment of COSPL are called here L and C, respectively.
It can be observed that Nelson's logic N4 is obtained from the {/, ∧, ∨, ∼}-fragment of COSPL by adding the exchange, contraction and weakening rules respectively of the form:
The (non-modal propositional) intuitionistic linear logic is obtained from FL by adding (ex).
The following theorem is known [15] .
Theorem 2.2 (Cut-Elimination for COSPL). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free COSPL.
The same theorem holds for FL, L and C. Using Theorem 2.2, we can derive the following property [15] .
Definition 2.4. A logic L is called explosive if for any formulas α and β,
Corollary 2.5 (Paraconsistency). COSPL is paraconsistent.
Illustrative example
In the following, it is shown that COSPL can be used in medical reasoning by the virtue of non-commutativity and paraconsistency. Paraconsistency. It is known that logics with paraconsistency can deal with inconsistency-tolerant reasoning more appropriately. An example using paraconsistency is briefly explained below. Assume a large medical knowledge-base M KB of symptoms and diseases, such as an expert system based on COSPL. It can also be assumed that M KB is inconsistent in the sense that there is a symptom predicate s(x) such that ∼s(x), s(x) ∈ M KB, where ∼s(x) means "a person x does not have a symptom s." This assumption is very realistic, because symptom is a vague concept, which is difficult to determine by any diagnosis. Then, M KB does not derive arbitrary disease d(x), which means "a person x suffers form a disease d", since paraconsistency ensures the fact that for some formulas α and β, both the sequents ∼α, α ⇒ β and α, ∼α ⇒ β are not provable. The paraconsistent COSPL-based M KB is thus inconsistency-tolerant. In the classical and intuitionistic logics, the sequent ∼s(x), s(x) ⇒ d(x) is provable for any disease d, and hence the non-paraconsistent formulation based on the logics are regarded as inappropriate to the application of medical knowledge base.
Constructible falsity. It is known that the property of constructible falsity guarantees the constructiveness of the underlying negation connective [9] . The disjunction connective ∨ of the intuitionistic logic is known to be constructive, since it has the disjunction property: if ⇒ α ∨ β is provable, then either ⇒ α or ⇒ β is provable. The property of constructible falsity, which does not hold for the intuitionistic logic, is regarded as the dual notion of the disjunction property. It is also known that logics with this property can allow to express inexact predicates. An inexact predicate is an incomplete predicate in an empirical domain. An example of an inexact predicate is a disease or symptom predicate such as melancholia(x), which means "a person x suffers from the first-stage melancholia." This predicate is incomplete in the sense that we can not determine exactly that the formula ∼melancholia(x) ∨ melancholia(x) is true. For more detailed discussions and examples, see e.g. [13] .
Resource-sensitivity. It is known that logics without the contraction rule (co) can elegantly represent the concept of "resource consumption". For example, we consider a sequent: coin, coin ⇒ cof f ee, which means "if we consume two coins, then we can take a cup of coffee." Then, if assuming the classical or intuitionistic logic, this sequent is logically equivalent to the sequent: coin ⇒ cof f ee, because of the presence of the contraction rule. On the other hand, we desire to distinguish such two sequents in the sense of the "resource-sensitivity", i.e., one coin and two coins have the different effect as resources. It is noted that COSPL is one of such resource-sensitive logics, since it has no contraction rule.
An appropriate resource consumption example is medicine consumption in medical reasoning. Consider a medicine m as a resource. An expression m(x) ⇒ recover(x) means "if a person x uses a medicine m to recover from a disease, then x makes a recovery from the disease with the medicine." In this case, m(x), m(x) ⇒ recover(x) and m(x) ⇒ recover(x) have the completely different meaning in the real world, because two medicines and one medicine have the different effect in general.
Priority. In the case of medicine consumption discussed above, it may not be sufficient to consider the effects of medicines. For example, if we consider two distinct medicines m 1 and m 2 , then the meanings of the following two expressions are regarded as different: m 1 (x), m 2 (x) ⇒ recover(x) and m 2 (x), m 1 (x) ⇒ recover(x), because the order of using medicines change the effect of the medicines. In other words, the time priority of using medicines is more important in general. A more detailed example is expressed as follows. An expression meal(x) means "a person x have a meal." Then, m(x), meal(x) ⇒ recover(x) and meal(x), m(x) ⇒ recover(x) have the different meaning, i.e., the effect of the medicine m is different whether the medicine is used after or before the meal.
To express such fine-grained medical reasoning, we have to use a noncommutative logic, such as COSPL, because, for example, logics with the exchange rule (ex) can not express the priority of the use of medicines. It can be known that in a sequent expression γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n ⇒ β in COSPL, the antecedent (γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n ) can express the time priority of consuming the resources γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n , in fact, (γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n ) is a sequence of formulas in COSPL, since COSPL has no exchange rule. It is remarked that two sequents γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n ⇒ β and γ 1 * γ 2 * · · · * γ n ⇒ β are logically equivalent in COSPL, and hence an expression γ 1 * γ 2 means "first γ 1 is consumed, next so is γ 2 ." It is also noted that in two expressions β/α and α\β, the implications / and \ represent resource consumption with priority, e.g. / means the consumption of (subscription) ascending order priority, and \ means the consumption of descending order priority.
In order to give an intuitive and natural formulation for the prioritized (or ordered) human reasoning as discussed above, some natural deduction systems using labelled assumptions will be introduced in the next section. In order to formulate natural deduction systems for L and C, the notion of labeled assumptions is introduced.
Definition 3.1. If α is a formula and n is a natural number, then α n is called an assumption (with respect to the underlying natural deduction system).
Let α, β be formulas and n, m be natural numbers. Let < and ≤ be strict partial order and partial order, respectively, on the set of natural numbers. Then, the strict partial and partial orders on the set of assumptions are defined as follows:
Let Γ, ∆ be sets of assumptions. Then, the strict partial and partial orders on the powerset of the set of assumptions are defined as follows:
It is remarked that if α and β are different as symbols, i.e., not(α ≡ β), then α n and β n are incomparable.
. Let Γ, ∆ be sets of assumptions. The inference rules of N L (a natural deduction system for L) are of the form:
It is remarked that although inference rules in N L may be applied to assumptions, yet labels are not inherited by conclusions of these rules applications.
Definition 3.3 (N C ). N C (a natural deduction system for C) is obtained from N L by adding the inference rules of the form:
The inference rules (/I), (\I), ( * I), (∼I), (∼/I), (∼\I) and (∼ * I) are called introduction rules, and the inference rules (/E), (\E), ( * E1), ( * E2), (∼E), (∼/E), (∼\E) and (∼ * E) are called elimination rules. The usual terminologies of major or minor premise of some inference rules are used in the following. In particular, the right premises of the rules ( * E1) and ( * E2) are called the major premises of the rules. The notion of proof, assumptions of proof, and end-formula of proof are defined as usual. It is remarked that an assumption α n is itself a proof. A formula α is said to be provable in a natural deduction system if there is a proof in the system with no open assumption whose end-formula is α.
In the definitions of N L and N C , the condition α n ∈ Γ of (/I) and (\I) corresponds to the fact that the underlying logics have no weakening rule (we). The condition Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ of (/E), (\E), ( * I), ( * E1) and ( * E2) corresponds to the fact that the underlying logics have no contraction rule (co). The conditions Γ ≤ {α n } and {α n } ≤ Γ of (/I) and (\I), respectively, and the conditions Γ ≤ ∆ and ∆ ≤ Γ of {(/E), ( * E1)} and {(\E), ( * E2)}, respectively, correspond to the fact that the underlying logics have no exchange rule (ex). We call the conditions concerning (we), (co) and (ex), the weakening, contraction and exchange conditions, respectively. By deleting any of these conditions, we can obtain the corresponding natural deduction system, systematically. For example, a natural deduction system for L+(ex), i.e., the {/, * }-fragment of intuitionistic linear logic, is obtained from N L by deleting the exchange conditions. Definition 3.4. Let P be a proof in a natural deduction system. An expression oa(P ) denotes the set of open assumptions of P , and an expression end(P ) denotes the end-formula of P .
To prove the equivalence between N C and C (and also between N L and L), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5 (Label shift). Let Γ be a (possibly empty) set of assumptions. If P is a proof in N C such that oa(P ) = Γ ∪ {α
and end(P ) = β, then for any natural number m ≥ 0, there is a proof P ′ in N C such that oa(P ′ ) = Γ ∪ {α
Proof. By induction on P .
Using Lemma 3.5, we will prove Lemma 3.7. In the proofs of Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, we use the notation Γ ′ for a corresponding labelled assumption set for a sequence Γ of formulas. We also use an expression Γ ′+m which means that Γ ′+m is obtained from a set Γ ′ of assumptions by m shifting to the labels of all the assumptions in Γ ′ .
Lemma 3.6. If P is a proof in N C such that oa(P ) = {α
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on P . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference in P . We only show the following case.
Case ( * E1): P is of the form:
where
By the hypothesis of induction, we have that the sequents Γ ⇒ (γ/β)/α and ∆ ⇒ α * β are provable in C. Then, we obtain:
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on a proof P of α 1 , ..., α k ⇒ β in C. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference in P . We show some cases.
Case (\left): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, there are proofs in N C such that
where n < r and n m + r < z, and hence ∆ ′ < Γ ′+r < Σ ′+z . Then, we have a required proof in N C :
Case (∼/left): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, we have that there is a proof in N C of the form:
.., δ n ) where 1 ≤ n, and also denotes β if ∆ = ∅. Then, we obtain a required proof:
Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 imply the following theorem. We also have the following theorem as the subproof of Theorem 3.8.
In order to define a reduction relation ⊲ on the set of proofs in N L (and N C ), we assume the usual definition of substitution for proofs, i.e., an assumption α n occurring in a proof P is replaced by a proof D with end(D) = α. This substitution can be defined exactly, and can also be observed that the set of proofs in N L (and N C ) is closed under the substitution 3 .
3 Strictly speaking, this fact is presented as follows. Let D be a proof such that oa(D) = Γ ∪ {α n }, end(D) = β, α n / ∈ Γ and Γ < {α n }. Let E be a proof such that oa(E) = ∆ and end(E) = α. If Γ < ∆, i.e., Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and Γ ≤ ∆, then the figure F which is obtained from D by substituting E for α n in D is a proof such that oa(F ) = Γ ∪ ∆ and end(F) = β. Definition 3.10. Let α be a formula occurring in a proof P . Then, α is called a maximum formula in P if α satisfies the following conditions: (1) α is a conclusion of an introduction rule and (2) α is the major premise of an elimination rule. A proof is said to be normal if it contains no maximum formula.
Definition 3.11 (Reduction for N L ). Let δ be a maximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R and is the major premise of an elimination rule R ′ . The reduction relation (for N L ) ⊲ at δ is defined as follows.
1. R is (/I) n and δ is β/α:
2. R is (\I) n and δ is α\β:
3. R is ( * I), R ′ is ( * E1), and δ is α * β:
4. R is ( * I), R ′ is ( * E2), and δ is β * α:
where I ∈ {/I, \I} and R ∈ {/E, \E, * I, * E1, * E2}.
It is remarked that in this definition, the conditions of proofs are preserved with respect to ⊲, e.g., for the case 4, the conditions Γ ∩ ∆ ∩ Π = ∅ and ∆ ≤ Σ ≤ Γ of the left hand side of ⊲ are preserved in the right hand side of ⊲. Thus, the set of proofs in N L is closed under ⊲ 4 .
Definition 3.12 (Reduction for N C ). Let γ be a maximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R. The reduction relation ⊲ of N C at γ is obtained from those of N L by adding the following conditions. 6. R is (∼I), and γ is ∼∼α:
7. R is (∼/I), and γ is ∼(β/α):
8. R is (∼\I), and γ is ∼(α\β):
9. R is (∼ * I), and γ is ∼(α * β):
where I ∈ {∼I, ∼E, ∼/I, ∼/E, ∼\I, ∼\E, ∼ * I, ∼ * E}.
It is remarked that the set of proofs in N C is closed under ⊲. 3.2. N 2 C and equivalence Definition 3.14 (N 2 C ). N 2 C is obtained from N C by replacing the inference rules (∼/I), (∼/E), (∼\I), (∼\E), (∼ * I) and (∼ * E) by the inference rules of the form: for Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ and Γ ≤ ∆,
Theorem 3.15 (Equivalence between N 2 C and N C ). A formula γ is provable in N 2 C if and only if γ is provable in N C .
Proof. (⇐=): We prove the statement by induction on a proof P of γ in N C . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference in P . We show some cases. Case (∼/I): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, we get a proof of α * ∼β in N 2 C such that . . . . Q ′ α * ∼β.
Then, we obtain a required proof in N 2 C :
Case (∼/E): P is of the form
By the hypothesis of induction, we get a proof of
(=⇒): We prove the statement by induction on a proof P of γ in N 2 C . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference in P . We only show the following case.
Case (∼/E1 * ): P is of the form:
By the hypothsis of induction, we obtain the proofs in N C of the form:
and hence a required proof is
Definition 3.16 (Reduction for N 2 C ). Let δ be a maximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R. The reduction relation ⊲ of N 2 C at δ is obtained from that of N L by adding the following conditions. 6 . R is (∼I), and δ is ∼∼α:
, and δ is ∼(β/α):
, and δ is ∼(α\β):
10. R is (∼\I * ), R ′ is (∼\E2 * ), and δ is ∼(α\β):
, and δ is ∼(α * β):
12. R is (∼ * I * ), R ′ is (∼ * E2 * ), and δ is ∼(β * α):
where I ∈ {∼I, ∼E} and R ∈ {∼/I * , ∼/E1
The set of proofs in N 2 C is closed under ⊲. The notions of reduction sequence and strong normalizability are the same as in the Definition 3.13.
The strong normalizability for N L , N C and N 2 C will be proved in the next section, by using the corresponding typed λ-calculi based on the CurryHoward correspondences. Let x, y be variables, and α, β be types. Suppose that the strict partial and partial orders <, ≤, respectively, on the set of variables are defined.
Typed λ-calculus
Then, the strict partial and partial orders on the set of typed variables are defined as follows:
1. x α = y β iff x = y and α ≡ β, 2. x α < y β iff x < y, 3. x α ≤ y β iff x < y or x α = y β .
Let Γ, ∆ be sets of typed variables. Then, the strict partial and partial orders on the powerset of the set of typed variables are defined as follows: 
It is observed that, in Definition 4.2, the items 2-8 correspond to the inference rules (/I), (\I), (/E), (\E), ( * I), ( * E1) and ( * E2), respectively. Hence, in Definition 4.2, the assumptions
in the conditions 2-8 correspond to the fact that the underlying logic has no exchange rule. The assumption x α ∈ F V (M β ) in the conditions 2 and 3 corresponds to the fact that the underlying logic has no weakening rule. The empty-variable assumptions such as F V (M β/α ) ∩ F V (N α ) = ∅ in the conditions 4-8 correspond to the fact that the underlying logic has no contraction rule. These empty-variable assumptions concerning the contraction rule have a crucial role in the simplicity of the strong normalization proof. The definition discussed is based on the definition of linear λ-term by Hindley [3] , and on the definition of two directional λ-term using two kinds of abstractions by Wansing [14, 15] . Hence the Curry-Howard correspondence can naturally be obtained. 
((λ
It can be observed that the set of typed λ-terms for λ L is closed under ⊲. It is known that the strong normalization theorem for the linear λ-terms for the implicational fragment can be proved using the function l from the set of terms to the set of natural numbers defined inductively by l(x) = 0, l(λx.M ) = l(M )+1 and l(M N ) = l(M )+l(N ). Since the linear λ-terms have the restriction related to the absence of the contraction rule, the fact "M ⊲ N implies l(M ) > l(N )" can be obtained, and using this fact, the strong normalization theorem can be proved. To prove the strong normalization for λ L , the function l is extended with the addition of the cases for • and [ , ]. Definition 4.5. A function f from the set of all typed λ-terms to the set of natural numbers is inductively defined by
Proof. We only prove (1) of this lemma by induction on M . (2) can be proved similarly. We show some cases. Let n = f (N ), p = f (P ) and q = f (Q).
(Case M ≡ x): The left hand side of the inequality is f ((λ r x.x)N ) = f (λ r x.x) + f (N ) = f (x) + 1 + f (N ) = n + 1. The right hand side is f ([N/x]x) = f (N ) = n. Therefore we have the required fact. 6 . We only consider the former case: f ([[N/x]P, Q]). The latter case can be treated similarly. By the hypothesis of induction, we have
(Case M ≡ λ r y.P where y = x and y / ∈ F V (N )): The left hand side is
We only consider the former case. By the hypothesis of induction, we have
Using this lemma, we can prove the following lemma.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on M . We show some cases.
(Case M ≡ ((λ r x.P )Q), N ≡ [Q/x]P ): By Lemma 4.6, we obtain
Using this lemma, we obtain the following theorem. Proof. Suppose that there is an infinite reduction sequence starting form M 0 such that M 0 ⊲ M 1 ⊲ · · · . Then, by Lemma 4.7, we have the fact that f (M 0 ) > f (M 1 ) > · · · is infinite. However this is the contradiction for the fact that f (M 0 ) is a natural number, and hence the reductions terminate.
Using this theorem, we obtain the following theorem. Proof. We only give a sketch of the proof. First, we consider a usual typeassignment system TAN L 8 which has appropriate typed inference rules such as . . . .
By introducing such a system, we can clarify the Curry-Howard correspondence as a result. It is noted that a figure which is obtained from a proof of (M α : α) in TAN L by deleting all typed λ-terms is a proof of α in N L , and conversely, for a proof of α in N L , there is an appropriate proof of ( This can straightforwardly be proved.
λ C and strong normalization
First, a typed λ-calculus with strong negation type, denoted λ C , is introduced, and next the strong normalization theorem for λ C is proved. 
if M δ is a typed λ-term, then (ι
It can be observed that the set of typed λ-terms for λ C is closed under ⊲. It is remarked that the Curry-Howard correspondence with respect to λ C and N C can naturally be obtained. We can thus introduce a type-assignment system TAN C with respect to λ C and N C in an appropriate way. For example, the following rules are used for TAN C :
and the following reduction condition can also be presented:
In order to prove the strong normalization theorem for λ C , the function f defined in Definition 4.5 is modified as follows. Definition 4.13. A function k from the set of all untyped λ-terms to the set of natural numbers is obtained from the same conditions as 1-4 for f in Definition 4.5 by adding the following condition.
The following lemma, which is the same as Lemma 4.6, holds for k.
Proof. We only prove (1) of this lemma by induction on M . (2) can be proved similarly. The proof of the subpart which is just related to λ L is the same as those in Lemma 4.6. Thus, it is enough to prove the cases for the ι j , ι −1 j -functions. We only show the case for the ι j -functions. The case for ι −1 j -functions can be proved similarly. Let n = k(N ) and p = k(P ).
(Case M ≡ ι j P for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}): The left hand side of the inequality is
Proof. By induction on M . By using Lemma 4.14, the λ L -cases are proved by the same way as in Lemma 4.7. Thus, it is enough to show k(ι
. This is obvious by the definition of k.
Using this lemma, we obtain the following theorem. We also obtain the following theorems. 
λ 2
C and strong normalization Next, we introduce a typed λ-calculus, denoted λ 2 C . In λ 2 C , the functions ι 1 and ι −1 1 are also used, but the other functions ι j , ι −1 j for j ∈ {2, 3, 4} are needless. The Curry-Howard correspondence with respect to λ 2 C and N 2 C can also be obtained. Since the proof of the strong normalization theorems for λ 2 C and N 2 C is similar to that of λ C and N C , the proof will be omitted. M α is a typed λ-term, then (ι 1 M α ) ∼∼α is a typed λ-term. 10. if M ∼∼α is a typed λ-term, then (ι
if
−1 1 M ∼∼α ) α is a typed λ-term. 11. if M α and N ∼β are typed λ-terms, F V (M α ) ≤ F V (N ∼β ) and F V (M α ) ∩ F V (N ∼β ) = ∅, then [M α , N ∼β ] ∼(β/α) is a typed λ- term. 12. if M (γ/∼β)/α and N ∼(β/α) are typed λ-terms, F V (M (γ/∼β)/α ) ≤ F V (N ∼(β/α) ) and F V (M (γ/∼β)/α ) ∩ F V (N ∼(β/α) ) = ∅, then (M (γ/∼β)/α • N ∼(β/α) ) γ is a typed λ-term. 13. if M ∼(β/α) and N ∼β\(α\γ) are typed λ-terms, F V (M ∼(β/α) ) ≤ F V (N ∼β\(α\γ) ) and F V (M ∼(β/α) ) ∩ F V (N ∼β\(α\γ) ) = ∅, then (M ∼(β/α) • N ∼β\(α\γ) ) γ is a typed λ-term.
if M ∼β and N α are typed λ-terms, F V
(M ∼β ) ≤ F V (N α ) and F V (M ∼β ) ∩ F V (N α ) = ∅, then [M ∼β , N α ] ∼(α\β) is a typed λ- term. 15. if M (γ/α)/∼β and N ∼(α\β) are typed λ-terms, F V (M (γ/α)/∼β ) ≤ F V (N ∼(α\β) ) and F V (M (γ/α)/∼β ) ∩ F V (N ∼(α\β) ) = ∅, then (M (γ/α)/∼β • N ∼(α\β) ) γ is a typed λ-term.
if M α\(∼β\γ) and N
Definition 4.20 (λ 2 C ). The reduction relation ⊲ with respect to λ 2 C is obtained from Definition 4.3 by adding the following conditions.
Theorem 4.21 (Strong normalization for λ 2 C and N 2 C ). All typed λ-terms for λ 2 C and all proofs for N 2 C are strongly normalizable. 
Alternative calculi and strong normalization
In the previous subsections, we considered two typed λ-calculi with the ι j , ι −1 j -functions. These systems, for example, have the following type assignment rules:
On the other hand, we can consider another forms of the simple type assignment rules:
The latter rules are regarded as analogues of the intersection type rules of certain intersection type assignment systems. A usual intersection type assignment system has the following simple rules for the intersection type ∩:
A type assignment system which corresponds to a logic has the following rules for the conjunction type ∧:
where M, N denotes the pairing function and π i denotes the projection functions.
In the following, we introduce two calculi λ 3 C and λ 4 C which are analogues of the intersection type assignment system. The calculi λ 3 C and λ 4 C are nearly equal to λ C and λ 2 C , respectively, but the equivalences have not yet been clarified. Types for λ 3 C and λ 4 C are obtained from those of λ L by adding the strong negation symbol ∼. 
The definition with respect to ∼ is from the definition of the λ c -terms (w.r.t. Nelson's logic N4) posed by Wansing [15] . 
It can be observed that the set of typed λ-terms for λ 3 C is closed under ⊲. In order to prove the strong normalization theorem for λ 3 C , the function f defined in Definition 4.5 is modified with the addition of the cases for ∼. For example, for the case of M ∼(α * β) ⊲ M ∼α * ∼β , we have to show h(M ∼(α * β) ) > h(M ∼α * ∼β ) for an appropriate function h. Definition 4.25. Let f be the function from the set of all untyped λ-terms to the set of natural numbers which is defined in Definition 4.5. A function g from the set of all types to the set of natural numbers is inductively defined by
, we have the required fact.
Using this lemma, we obtain the following theorem. Next, we introduce the typed λ-calculus λ 4 C . Since the proof of the strong normalization theorem for λ 4 C is similar to that for λ 3 C , the proof is omitted. 
The inference rules (1E), (⊥E), (∼1E), (∼⊤E), (/E), (\E), ( * E), (∧E1), (∧E2), (∨E), (∼E), (∼/E), (∼\E), (∼ * E), (∼ ∧ E), (∼ ∨ E1) and (∼ ∨ E2) are called elimination rules, and the other inference rules are called introduction rules. These elimination rules presented here are called in [6] general elimination rules. In elimination rules, the premise containing the logical connective or constant is called major premise. The other premises are called minor premises. It is remarked that the rule of the form:
is admissible in N-COSPL. In order to distinguish it from the usual notion of (weak) normalization with respect to reduction, the term "general normal form" in this definition is used. Proof. We prove (1) by induction on the cut-free proof P of Γ ⇒ γ in COSPL. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We show some cases.
Case (/left): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, there are general normal proofs P ′ 1 and P ′ 2 of Γ ⊢ α and ∆, β, Σ ⊢ γ, respectively, in N-COSPL, and hence a required proof is
By the hypothesis of induction, there is a general normal proof P ′ 1 of Γ, α, ∼β, ∆ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL, and hence a required proof is
Next, we prove (2) by induction on a proof Q of Γ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of Q. We show some cases.
Case (/E): Q is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, the sequents (Π ⇒ β/α), (Γ ⇒ α) and (∆, β, Σ ⇒ γ) are provable in COSPL, and hence a required proof is
Case (∼/E): Q is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, the sequents Π ⇒ ∼(β/α) and Γ, α, ∼β, ∆ ⇒ γ are provable in COSPL, and hence a required proof is
Theorem 5.4 (Normalization for N-COSPL). Every proof P of Γ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL can be transformed into a general normal proof P ′ of Γ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL.
Proof. Let P be a proof of Γ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL. Then, the sequent Γ ⇒ γ is provable in COSPL by Theorem 5.3 (2), and hence Γ ⇒ γ is provable in cut-free COSPL by Theorem 2.2. By Theorem 5.3 (1), there is a general normal proof P ′ of Γ ⊢ γ in N-COSPL.
U-COSPL and normalization
We introduce a uniform calculus U-COSPL for COSPL, following the framework by Negri [7] . U-COSPL has not only general elimination rules, but also general introduction rules.
Definition 5.5 (U-COSPL). U-COSPL is obtained from N-COSPL by replacing the introduction rules and axioms (⊢ 1), (Γ ⊢ ⊤), (Γ ⊢ ∼⊥) by the general introduction rules of the form:
It is remarked that the rule (subst) is also admissible in U-COSPL. In the inference rules of U-COSPL, the premise containing the logical connective or constant is called major premise.
We must modify the notion of general normal form as follows. Theorem 5.8 (Normalization for U-COSPL). Every proof P of Γ ⊢ γ in U-COSPL can be transformed into a general normal proof P ′ of Γ ⊢ γ in U-COSPL.
6. Remarks
Adding structural rules
As mentioned in Section 3, in the framework of N L , N C and N 2 C , we can define the natural deduction systems for any logics over L and C by adding any combinations of the structural rules (ex), (we) and (co). We can also show, in a similar way as in Section 4, the strong normalization theorems for the natural deduction systems for L+(ex), L+(we), L+(ex)+(we), C+(ex), C+(we) and C+(ex)+(we). On the other hand, we cannot prove the strong normalization theorems for the systems for L+(co), L+(we)+(co), C+(co) and C+(we)+(co), because the set of proofs in these systems is not closed under substitution, i.e., the set of proofs is not closed under ⊲. Also the strong normalization theorems for the natural deduction systems for the other logics with (co) cannot be proved in the same way as discussed in this paper. But, by using the method of Mouri [5] , we can prove the strong normalization theorems for the corresponding natural deduction systems for L+(ex)+(co) and L+(ex)+(co)+(we). In fact, a systematic proof for the {/, * , ∧}-fragments of intuitionistic substructural logics was proposed in [5] . The strong normalization theorems for the corresponding natural deduction systems for C+(ex)+(co) and C+(ex)+(co)+(we) have not been proved yet.
In the framework related to N-COSPL and U-COSPL, we can give some normalizing natural deduction systems for other substructural logics. Indeed, the natural deduction systems for intuitionistic and classical full linear logics were introduced by Negri [6, 7] . In the same framework, natural deduction systems for intuitionistic and classical logics were studied by Negri and von Plato [8] . The framework by Negri and von Plato [8] was extended to Nelson's logic N4 by Kamide [4] .
We then have the following facts. In general, it is difficult to obtain a direct proof of (strong) normalization theorem with ∨. For example, it is known that the permutation conversion with respect to ∨ makes difficult the proof. Moreover, the conditions for labelled assumptions in N − C are very complex to define a reduction relation. If we try to prove a weak normalization theorem with respect to N − C indirectly using a correspondence between N − C and cut-free COSPL − , then we have to modify the words "COSPL − " and "proof Q" in the item (2) in the facts discussed above to "cut-free COSPL − " and "normal proof Q", respectively. But, this cannot be proved easily, because the corresponding "label shift lemma" is not proved for such a formulation.
Related works
Introducing the exchange conditions in N L is essentially the same as introducing the sequence-type assumptions instead of the set-type labeled assumptions. If we adopt such sequence-type assumptions, then we have to modify the formulation of the inference rules. 
β α\β
where the cancelled assumption [α] was the leftmost uncancelled assumption before applying this rule. Such a formulation using the sequence-type assumptions has already been studied by van Benthem [1] and Tiede [12] .
The following inference rules for * were also considered [1, 12] where α and β in ( * Eg) have to be the two left-most uncancelled assumptions of the proof of γ. A natural deduction system for intuitionistic non-commutative linear logic was studied by Polakow and Pfenning [10] . Some systematic treatments of the Curry-Howard correspondences for various substructural logics were established by Gabbay and de Queiroz [2] and by Wansing [14] .
Conclusion
In this paper, firstly, the natural deduction systems N L , N C and N 2 C for the {/, \, * }-fragment L of FL (full Lambek logic), the {/, \, * , ∼}-fragment C of COSPL (constructive sequential propositional logic) and also C, respectively, were introduced. The strong normalization and Church-Rosser theorems for these systems were proved using the corresponding typed λ-calculi λ L , λ C and λ 2 C via Curry-Howard correspondences. Two alternative calculi λ 3 C and λ 4 C were also discussed. Secondly, the natural deduction systems N-COSPL and U-COSPL for COSPL were introduced, and the normalization theorems for these systems were proved. The framework for COSPL also works for FL.
The merits of the framework of N L , N C and N 2 C are summarized as follows. (1) The corresponding typed λ-calculi λ L , λ C and λ 2 C can be obtained via the Curry-Howard correspondences. (2) A simple proof of the strong normalization theorems can be given. (3) A systematic treatment of other substructural logics is available by deleting the labelled assumption conditions concerning the structural rules. (4) A natural and intuitive formulation for prioritized (or ordered) human reasoning as discussed in Section 2 can be given. The demerits of the framework of N L , N C and N 2 C are as follows.
(1) The subformula property does not hold. (2) Extending the framework both with ∧ and ∨ is not easy. To improve such demerits, the systems N-COSPL and U-COSPL are introduced, i.e., the merits of the framework of N-COSPL and U-COSPL are as follows. (1) The full set of connectives can be treated. Indeed, the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ can also be handled, although such extensions are not discussed in this paper. ( 2) The subformula property holds for the corresponding systems for FL. On the other hand, the subformula property does not hold for N-COSPL and U-COSPL, e.g. ∼α or ∼β is not a subformula of ∼(α ∧ β), but such a non-subformula can appear in a normal proof.
